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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - - :A.MANTHA KAY FRYE FARRELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs -

Case No. 12163

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,

Utah

State Prison,

Defendant-Respondent.

- - - - - -

---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT IN SUPPORT OF A
PETITION FOR REHEARING

RELIEF SOUGHT
The plaintiff-appellant in the above captioned
case respectfully petitions this court for a rehearing

and requests that this court vacate and set aside its

order and judgment affirming the judgment of the lower
court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN
CONSIDERING WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND WHETHER A KNCWING, VOLUNTARY, AND INTELLIGENT PLEA OF GUILTY HAD BEEN MADE BECAUSE THE
SENTENCING CCURT HAD FAILED TO EXAMINE INTO
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CHARGE AND TO

INSTRUCT APPELLANT OF THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE
AGAINST HER, THE ELEMENTS COMPRISING THE CHARGE
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHICH ARE WAIVED '
BY A PLEA OF GUILTY.
The United States Supreme Court in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) established strict
procedural requirements which must be followed by any
court in accepting a plea of guilty.

As noted in

appellant's original brief, these requirements are
(1) the defendant's motivation of entering a guilty

plea must be inquired into by the court ("For, as we
have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission
of conduct; it is a conviction.

Ignorance, incom-

prehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle
or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of
uncons ti tutionali ty." 3 95 U.S. at 243); (2) defendant
must possess an understanding of the law in relation
to the facts (395 U.S. at 243 n.5.); finally, the

defendant should be informed that a guilty plea will
result in waiver of trial by jury, right against
self-incrimination, and right of confrontation.

"We

presume a waiver of these three important
federal rights from a silent record."
Turning now to this Court's opinion and the facts
of the instant case, it becomes obvious that the

E.oykin criteria were not considered in reaching the
decision.

First, the opinion states that "the court

explained the right [to Mrs. Farrell] to have an
attorney. TT

There has never been any contention by

appellant that the right to an attorney had been
violated.

The fact that appellant had an attorney

is irrelevant to the Boykin mandate.
case the defendant had an attorney.

In the Boykin
"Before the

matter came to trial, the court determined that
petitioner was indigent and appointed counsel to
represent him. 11

Id. at 239.

Had Boykin only required

the necessity of a court appointed attorney, the
decision of the Alabama Supreme Court would have been
affirmed.

Instead, the Court found that the mere

presence of an attorney was not sufficient to protect
the rights of a defendant:

rather, the presiding judge

had an obligation to appraise defendant of the elements
0f the crime and the constitutional rights being waived
in addition to inquiring into the motivations for the
guilty plea.

Second, the Court has misconstrued the duress
argument presented by appellant concerning Section
7E,-l-41 u.c.A. 1953.

The Court in its opinion stated,

11

,!

,\
"

nBy giving full weight to its words and
spirits [76-1-41], it still does not aid
the appellant • • • Even if she had been
coerced by her husband, she departed from
his coercion and corranitted an entirely
different crime of her own choosing."
The question was never presented to this Court whether
76-1-41 U.C.A., 1953 could, at this stage,
be used to grant appellant a writ of habeas corpus.
Rather, this statute was cited principally to show
that appellant had been under her husband's duress
from the time the crime was corrunitted to the time the

guilty plea was entered, and to illustrate that a
11

Jack of capacity" defense could have been raised at

the trial court level to determine the exact facts
surrounding her husband's coercion.

The circumstances:

of this coercion did not even come to light until the

Habeas Corpus hearing a year later.

As appellant

stated in her brief,
"The defense of lack of capacity must be
made timely, or it is lost; appellant's
conviction cannot now be attacked on the
ground that she lacked capacity. Nevertheless
section 76-1-41 Utah Code Annotated 1953, raises a presumption of duress
in appellant's case, and had the court
fulfilled its duty under Boykin it must be
preswned the matter of duress would have
become apparent. • • • In any case, had
the court made sufficient inquiry it would

r,

1

'

have discovered the influence of the husband
had been exerted at all times relevant to the
making of the plea; under such circumstances
tthe utmost solicitude of which courts are '
capablet required by Boykin would have necessitated reopening the matter of the plea at
some time after the lunch recess on June 12
in order to give appellant a chance to make
her plea free of the influence of her husband,
and with full understanding of her defense."
Brief for Appellant at 16.
Thus, the Boykin mandate of inquiring into the true
motivation of a guilty plea was not followed by the
trial court nor discussed by this Court.
Similarly, the statement by appellant in her
habeas corpus proceeding that she entered her plea
of guilty so that she could be with her husband and
"have some place to sleep at nights and something to
eat" is another factor which should have been considere
by

the sentencing judge had the proper inquiry been

made before the guilty plea was accepted.

Although

this Court said, "Even if her testimony were true,
it would not justify her release from prison in this

proceeding'' the Court cannot mean to say that a trial
court should not examine the motives of a person at
SPntencing.

If such an investigation does not occur,

a completely innocent person may be allowed to plead

-5-

T1ilty and be sentenced to the state prison merely
because of some motivation completely unrelated to
guilt.

The United States Supreme Court in Boykin

sought to prevent this type of injustice by requiring
the trial court to inquire into the facts and motivations giving rise to the guilty plea.

Under this

mandate it was the duty of the trial court to make
such an inquiry.

Whether appellant's motivations

would have influenced the trial judge's decision to
accept the guilty plea is only conjectual at this
stage of the proceedings.

However, because appellant

was denied this right of inquiry by the judge, the
guilty plea standards of Boykin have been violated
and the plea must be invalid.
Third, if appellant had been told by the trial
court that capacity is a necessary element of the
crime of supplying implements to a prisoner and if
the trial court had specifically told appellant of
the exact crime she was charged with, it is very
Possible that appellant would have decided that a
guilty plea should not have been entered.
this too is conjectual.

Of course,

But Boykin requires that the

defendant understand the law in relation to the facts.
Hcid this simple procedure been complied with, there

could be no question, either at the trial stage or
the appellant stage, that appellant did not understand
I

the nature of the crime or the elements comprising it. :
Finally, the court completely ignores appellant's

!I

argwnent that she was not appraised of the rights
which are waived when a plea of guilty is entered.
The specific rights enumerated by the Boykin Court
include right of trial by jury, right against selfincrimination, and right of confrontation of witnesses.
It is clear from the sentencing court record and

testimony at the habeas corpus proceeding that appellan
was not told of the forfeiture of these rights when
her guilty plea was entered.

It is equally clear that

appellant did not even know that she had right against
self-incrimination or that it was being waived.

Brief

for Appellant at 22-23.
CONCLUSION
As the Court said in Boykin, "A plea of guilty
is more than a confession which admits that the accused
did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing
remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."
395 U.S. at 242.

Because of the serious consequences

Which follow a plea of guilty, it is up to courts throu
out the country to insure that the defendant can make

he possible defenses to it, the penalty which will
,8

suffered, and rights which are being waived by such

,1ea.

The requirements of Boykin will not cause

trmecessary delay or hardship on the sentencing court.
procedure is relatively simple and if followed
rill give the defendant who is about to enter a guilty
ilea the same type of protection that Miranda gives the
1ccused before being arrested.

Because the trial court

.n the instant case failed to follow the Boykin mandate

1f the United States Supreme Court the appellant was

tnlawfully incarcerated.

It is submitted that this

:ourt should vacate its former judgment and grant
.ppellant' s writ for habeas corpus.

Such action will

1ot only insure that the instant appellant is afforded
ustice but will also establish a state court procedure
'hich will insure that future defendants will, where
roper, make voluntary, knowing, and meaningful pleas

1

if guilty.

Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
College of Law
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
Attorney for Appellant

